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Abstract
Economic uncertainty, parental selection, and the criminal activity of the ‘children of 
the wall’**
We explore the link between parental selection and criminality of children in a new 
context. After the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, East Germany experienced a very 
large, but temporary, drop in birth rates mostly driven by economic uncertainty. We 
exploit this natural experiment in a differences in differences setup to first estimate 
that the children from these affected (smaller) cohorts are relatively much more likely 
to be criminally active. Using individual level data, we provide evidence that women 
who gave birth at this period of uncertainty were negatively selected into fertility. 
Further investigation of the underlying mechanisms reveals that emotional attachment 
and intergenerational transmission of risk attitudes play important roles in the parental 
selection-crime of children relationship. Finally, results for siblings support a causal 
interpretation of our findings.
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1. Introduction 
Cohort composition, as well as its size, may affect cohort outcomes. A prime example 
of the effect of parental selection is provided by the legalization of abortion in the U.S. in the 
Seventies, which has been associated with reduction in welfare recipiency (Gruber, Levine 
and Staiger [1999]), drug use (Charles and Stevens [2006]) and teenage motherhood 
(Donohue, Grogger and Levitt [2009]). Controversially, Donohue and Levitt (2001) argue that 
the legalization of abortion was responsible for up to half of the drop in crime observed in the 
Nineties. The suggested mechanism is that fewer “unwanted” children, who would have had a 
greater probability of participating in these negative outcomes, were born. As such the 
resulting cohorts were positively selected; i.e., the mean characteristics of parents were better 
after abortion became legal. Note, however, that the opposite selection was found in Romania 
for cohorts affected by a repeal of the abortion legislation (Pop-Eleches [2006]) suggesting 
that in this context poorer, less educated women may have been constrained in their access to 
abortion. 
The controversy surrounding Donohue and Levitt’s finding suggests that it is unclear 
whether changes in abortion legislation can be used to identify changes in long term trends in 
criminal activity. First, Donohue and Levitt (2001) rely on the ratio of abortion to birth to 
approximate the fraction of unwanted children, but this ignores that abortion was possible 
even when illegal. Additionally, the legalization of abortion, by reducing the marginal costs of 
pregnancy, increases the number of conceptions, thus affecting the numerator of the abortion 
ratio. As Ananat et al. (2009) show, while the change in the availability of legal abortion is 
potentially exogenous, the abortion ratio is not. Second, it is not possible to differentiate 
positive parental selection from a cohort size effect which goes in the same direction; i.e., a 
smaller but better endowed cohort is compared to a larger one with worse observed parental 
characteristics. As such the reported estimate is an upper bound of the effect of parental 
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selection, and indeed Pop-Eleches (2006) observes that half of the parental selection effect 
observed in Romania stems from the crowding out of public resources for the larger cohorts 
born after the abortion ban. Third, relying on small differences in the timing of the repeal of 
anti-abortion laws between States1 after which all cohorts are ‘treated’ makes it difficult to 
separate time trends from the actual policy effects. Fourth, neither the argument about 
“unwanted children” nor the mechanisms by which parental selection affects the children 
outcomes have so far been substantiated, due to lack of appropriate data. As such, the 
literature, and especially the validity of Donohue and Levitt’s findings on the effect of 
abortion on crime have been hotly debated and seriously questioned in a number of 
subsequent articles2.  
In this paper we propose a novel identification strategy which sidesteps these 
problems. Instead of changes to abortion law we rely on a large economic uncertainty shock 
which dramatically reduced fertility and affected cohort composition, temporary and locally. 
More precisely, we exploit the large drop in fertility in East Germany following the collapse 
of the Berlin Wall3. Over a three-year period the fertility rate in the former East Germany was 
more than halved, an unprecedented peace-time event, before returning to trend. Throughout 
the manuscript we refer to the cohorts born in the eastern Länder4  between 1991 and 1993 as 
the ‘Children of the Wall’ (CoW).  
                                                            
1  Abortion became legally available in 1970 in five States (Alaska, California, Hawaii, New York and 
Washington) while the rest of the country waited until the ruling of the Supreme Court in “Roe vs Wade” of 
1973 to make it legal.  
2 Rather than using the abortion ratio, Joyce (2004) estimates a reduced form model and, after controlling for 
State specific trends, reports no significant effect of abortion on future crime. Cook and Laub (2002) question the 
timing implied by Donohue and Levitt (2001) and note that the crime reduction appears to start too late to be 
driven by the abortion reform, while Foote and Goetz (2003) and Joyce (2009) are unable to replicate Donohue 
and Levitt’s findings even using the same specification. These concerns were mostly addressed in responses by 
Donohue and Levitt (2004, 2008) and their results have been somewhat confirmed for Canada (Sen [2007]). 
3 An early example of the impact of social change on fertility is provided in Rindfuss et al (1978) who document 
the effect of Brown vs Board of Education in 1954 which declared school segregation illegal. This Supreme 
Court decision would have affected children being schooled in States still practicing discrimination; i.e. Southern 
States. This social change led to a drop in the number of white birth in the South of 0.7% in 1955 while birth 
numbers were increasing by close to 2 % nationally. 
4 Throughout the paper, we will use interchangeably “Land” or “State” to refer to the 16 constituent states of the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Note also that the plural of Land is Länder.  
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The effect of the socio-economic upheavals following the collapse of the East German 
regime on fertility decision and parental selection is a priori ambiguous, since the substitution 
and income effects of female earnings push the demand for children in different directions. In 
practice, there is a relative consensus on the existence of a pro-cyclical pattern in fertility (see 
Sobotka, Skirbekk, and Philipov [2011] for a review). There is however far less evidence of 
parental selection with regard to the business cycle. Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2004) suggest 
positive selection into motherhood in terms of education and marital status; i.e. parental 
selection is pro-cyclical. We can expect, and we document, that the parents who decided to 
give birth in former East Germany during the period of great economic uncertainty following 
the reunification of Germany were negatively selected. Additionally, we show that the fertility 
drop is not due to a change in abortion behavior but mostly driven by a reduction in 
conception. Like Donohue and Levitt (2001) we first focus on the criminal activity of children 
as a strong revelator of parental selection. This is a relevant proxy for parental selection since: 
i. the determinants of selection into fertility and offending participation of children are 
correlated (Sampson and Laub [1993]); ii. criminality can be transmitted between generations 
(Hjalmarsson and Lindquist [2012]) and; iii. a small number of individuals can be responsible 
for a large fraction of crimes (Tracy, Wolfgang and Figlio [1990]).  
Second, since the cohorts we are interested in are much smaller than usual, we can 
immediately reject any crowding out effect and in contrast would expect the small cohort size 
to positively impact outcomes such as education. Consequently, if parental selection is proved 
to be negative for these children, the parental selection and cohort size effects go in opposite 
directions and our results should be interpreted as lower bound estimates of the true effect of 
parental selection. 
Third, the natural experiment we exploit led to a very profound but short-lived 
exogenous fertility shock in former East Germany only, which creates clear pre- and post-
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cohorts. Moreover, no drop in fertility was observed in the former West Germany, which can 
then be considered a natural control since those born on either side of the “border” where 
subject to ever more similar educational and socio-economic environments when growing up 
in re-unified Germany. This group enables us to credibly account for the potential effect of 
shared macro shocks, under the assumption that the two parts of the country face a common 
crime trend, which we show mostly holds. We thus use a differences in differences estimator, 
whereby the criminal activity of children growing up in the eastern part of the reunified 
country is compared to the one for those growing up in the western part, over time. Moreover, 
we have detailed measures of arrest for different age groups by state (Land) which allows us 
to account for unobservable characteristics at the state level, such as policing strategy, that 
would affect the probability of arrest at a given period. As such, we can clearly separate a 
cohort effect from trends in arrest. 
The literature on parental selection has been plagued by the inability to 
comprehensively document the parents’ characteristics or the mechanism whereby they may 
lead to specific outcomes for children. Having documented the impact of parental selection on 
criminal activity, our fourth contribution to the literature is to fill this gap by exploiting very 
rich individual level data with information on mother and child characteristics, in order to 
expand the knowledge on the mechanisms through which parental selection affects the 
offending behavior of future cohorts. This data allows us to consider the previously used 
maternal characteristics (age, education, marital status, and employment) to establish the 
direction of the selection into fertility, but we also expand on two previously overlooked sets 
of characteristics: i) maternal emotional attachment and parenting competence as expressed 
by children themselves and ii) risk attitude of both mothers and children. We believe these to 
be potentially crucial pieces of the fertility-crime puzzle since i) reveals parental quality more 
objectively and ii) risk preference could influence both fertility of the mothers and offending 
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decisions of the children. As such we document more precisely the parental selection and 
assess potential mechanisms by which it affects children’s outcomes. Additionally, we 
propose a simple test on whether the observed effects for children are driven by 
positive/negative parental selection or just being born at a particular good/bad economic time. 
For example, the fetal programming hypothesis asserts that parental stress while in the womb 
can lead to abnormal emotional control (see van den Bergh et al. [2005] for a review), that 
itself could lead to negative outcomes even without parental selection (see Aizer, Stroud and 
Buka [2009] for example). We test whether such a mechanism is at play here by focusing on 
key outcomes of the siblings of the ‘Children of the Wall’. These older brothers and sisters 
would be expected to score similarly on evaluation of parental skills and risk attitude if those 
are driven by parental selection and not by being born in a particular environment. 
Our main empirical analysis and the ensuing findings developed in the paper are the 
following. We first clearly document the unprecedented drop in birth rate observed in East 
Germany just after the fall of the Berlin Wall5 and give a number of explanations as to why it 
happened in the context of the historical and institutional background; one of the main reason 
appears to be the fear of the economic uncertainty following reunification.  
Unfortunately, no dataset includes both crime and parental information, therefore we 
rely on two sources of data. We use administrative information at the Land level, to build a 
panel dataset on age-group arrests by Land, year and cohorts. Adopting a differences in 
differences strategy, we show that the offending behavior of the ‘Children of the Wall’ is 
much worse than that of previous cohorts. We estimate that the CoWs exhibit arrest rates at 
least 40 percent higher than comparable peers and that this is spread across most crime types, 
and holds for both genders. Moreover, the differences in criminal activity start appearing at a 
young age – as early as age 6. These findings are confirmed in a large number of alternative 
                                                            
5 Other East-European countries also experienced drops in fertility following the collapse of the communist 
regimes in place however their magnitudes were substantially smaller than that observed in East Germany 
(UNECE, [2000]). 
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specification and robustness checks which enable us to reject that the results are driven by 
time specific unobservable characteristics.    
These findings are in line with the results of Donohue and Levitt (2001) and consistent 
with negative parental selection. Using individual level survey data from the German 
Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) we report strong evidence of negative selection of women 
who chose to give birth in East Germany just after the end of the communist regime. These 
women were on average younger, less educated, more likely to be single and economically 
inactive. Moreover, their children rate their relationship with their mothers and how 
supportive their mothers were, very badly: they are 11 to 14 percentage points less likely to 
say that their mother is an important person in their life, or that she loves them, and CoWs are 
30% less likely to think they are receiving adequate support from their mothers. We interpret 
this as corroborating the bad parenting explanation which is often put forward in the abortion-
crime literature or the long-term effect of early rearing conditions (Conti et al. [2012]). This is 
nonetheless quite a surprising finding as we would have expected these children to be 
‘wanted’ since there was no barrier to using most forms of birth control.  This conundrum 
may be explained by differences in risk preference. We find that the women who had children 
during the very uncertain years after the fall of the Berlin Wall are much more willing to take 
risk, and especially what we define as ‘bad’ types of risk. This may well explain why they 
made what were with hindsight relatively sub-optimal fertility decisions, and end up being 
relatively poor mothers to the children they chose to have. 
We also show that the ‘Children of the Wall’ themselves have much higher 
willingness to take risk which could explain their higher than expected offending propensity. 
This result fits well with recent evidence on inter-generational risk attitude transmission 
(Dohmen et al., [2012]) and is perhaps one of the crucial pieces in understanding the fertility-
crime relationship puzzle. While no crime participation date is available in the GSOEP, we 
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show that on other outcomes, including schooling which is traditionally correlated with 
criminal participation, CoW perform worse than their peers. 
Finally, we reject the possibility that these children have worse outcomes due to being 
born in bad economic times. The CoWs’ siblings also report a similarly poor relationship with 
their mothers and are also much more willing to take risk, which is consistent with a parental 
fixed effect of poor parenting skills. The CoWs negative outcomes are thus driven by the 
higher fraction of parents with poor parenting skills in this cohort compared to previous (and 
subsequent) cohorts. 
Our findings confirm, as conjectured by Donohue and Levitt (2001), that parental 
selection may be one of the best predictors of the future criminality of a cohort, and that this 
most likely works through quality of parenting and risk attitude transmission. These 
conclusions have potentially important policy implications. First, provision of public services 
(school places, police numbers, etc) should not only be based on the size of an incoming 
cohort, and more attention should be paid on its composition. Second, since the effects on 
criminal behavior start appearing as early as age six, it calls for targeted interventions from a 
very young age since this is when preferences are still malleable (Heckman et al. [2010]). The 
right target group of children is however difficult to identify since parenting skills or a 
generalized measure of risk attitude are typically not observed.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 goes over the institutional 
background surrounding the period of the fertility drop we exploit as a natural experiment and 
considers various possible explanations on why the fertility dropped. Section 3 describes the 
various datasets used and specifies the differences-in-differences strategy we adopt 
throughout. Section 4 presents the arrest results for the ‘Children of the Wall’. Section 5 
reports our finding regarding the mechanisms at work behind the fertility crime-relationship 
using individual level data. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.    
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2. Institutional Background and the Fertility Drop 
 
2.1 East Germany and the German re-unification 
In the aftermath of World War II, Germany was split along the positions of the 
occupying armies with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany) and the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) being officially founded in 1949. The 
GDR developed as one of the most orthodox of the former European Communist regimes. As 
the two countries’ economic and political performances diverged, more and more citizens 
from East Germany migrated by crossing the border into West Berlin. To stop this exodus, a 
wall was built around the western part of the city in 1961. The Berlin Wall became the 
symbol of the forty year physical and socio-economic separation of a people which had 
previously shared a common destiny.  
By the end of the 1980s, a series of sudden and radical political changes led to the 
rapid collapse of the communist regimes in most of Eastern Europe. In the GDR large 
demonstrations against the regime started in September 1989 and emblematically culminated 
with the televised destruction of the Berlin Wall on the evening of the 9th November 1989, as 
the borders between East and West Germany were declared opened. There was a strong 
political will to quickly re-unite the two countries. By July 1990, a common currency was 
introduced and re-unification was completed less than a year later in October 1990 (see for 
example, Judt [2005] for details). The very abrupt end of almost half a century of communist 
rule and the express re-unification that followed was a huge unexpected shock and led to a 
period of great socio-economic uncertainties for the citizen of the new East-German Länder6. 
                                                            
6 We are not the first to use German re-unification as a natural experiment to investigate the occupational effect  
on precautionary (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln [2005]) and household saving (Fuchs-Schündel [2008]), 
preference for redistribution (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln [2007]), consumption behaviour (Bursztyn and 
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This was perhaps best reflected by the massive fall in the number of births that occurred there 
in the years just after the fall of the Berlin Wall.  
 
2.2 The Fertility Drop 
Figure 1 shows the crude birth rate (per 1,000 women) between 1950 and 2008 for 
East and West Germany. The first thing to note is that, while at a somewhat lower level in the 
East, the trends in fertility up to 1989 were very similar in both countries: a post-war baby 
boom until the mid-1960s, a rapid decrease (readjustment) in the following decade, and a 
relative stabilization between 1970 and 1990. The somewhat larger increase in fertility in East 
Germany starting in 1974 was the result of the adoption of pro-natal policies, providing a 
range of welfare benefits to parents (see Reinheckel et al. [1998] for details). However these 
policies only had a temporary effect so that by the mid-Eighties, fertility trends in both 
countries were similar. What stands out in Figure 1 is the massive and temporary collapse in 
birth rates in the East, but not in the West, following the fall of the Berlin Wall. It has been 
defined by demographers as the “most substantial fall in birth rates that ever occurred in 
peacetime” (Conrad, Lechner and Werner [1996], p.331). Within a year, the birth rate 
dropped by 40 percent and reached an all-time low in 1993, when it was only half of its 1989 
level. This fertility drop was relatively short lived, and a strong recovery started in 1994.  
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
To better illustrate the sharp deviation from trend that occurred in East Germany after 
the end of Communism, Figure 2 depicts annual changes in the crude birth rate between East 
and West Germany; i.e. yearly differences-in-differences coefficients. The horizontal line 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Cantoni [2012]) or the economic impact of networks (Burchardi and Hassan [2013]). No study has however 
previously focused on the outcome of the children born during this period as we do in this paper.  
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defines years with no difference in the changes in crude birth rates between the two countries. 
In the forty years up to the fall of the Berlin Wall (denoted by the vertical line in 1990), this 
gap never exceeded + or – 15 percent. The difference in crude birth rate evolution after this is 
striking. While West Germany carries on trend, East Germany deviates by 50 percent in the 
year following the end of communism before catching up from 1994. Figure 2 clearly 
illustrates two important points that are relevant to our identification: i) pre-1990, fertility 
trends were consistently similar between East and West ii) the fertility drop affecting East 
Germany after the collapse of the Wall was short-lived and fertility started recovering within 
three years. As such, we define as ‘Children of the Wall’, the cohorts of individuals born 
between 1991 and 1993 in the Eastern Länder.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Finally, to more precisely link the timing of the fertility drop to the regime change in 
East Germany, we consider, in Figure 3, the monthly number of births for the two regions. 
The data is only available from January 1990 onwards but we observe that the number of 
births only started to sharply fall in August of that year, that the number of births in East 
Germany stops falling in early 19947, and that the number of births in West Germany remains 
remarkably consistent throughout. The exact timing of the onset of the fall in births numbers 
in the East is very interesting since it occurs exactly nine months after the fall of the Berlin 
Wall; i.e. by August 1990. This is a first piece of evidence that the collapse of the regime was 
not foreseen and that the drop is not driven by immediate use of abortion. As such; it was a 
change in the decisions to conceive that drove the reduction in fertility. Note also that the drop 
                                                            
7 Since birth rate in the Eastern Länder started dropping from August 1990 onwards, the 1990 cohort can be 
considered partially treated. However, in the absence of data on month of birth we cannot use the discontinuity. 
Similarly, the 1994 cohort can be considered partially treated. We therefore also consider whether our main 
results are robust to slight changes to the definition of the ‘Children of the Wall’.  
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in births in the East is not solely due to displacement of mothers-to-be to the West, since the 
numbers of births in the West remains on trend.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 
2.3 Explaining the Fertility Drop 
We consider three potential reasons why fertility fell so sharply in East Germany after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall: change in birth control provision, East to West migration, and 
economic uncertainty. Although it is difficult to exactly measure the relative importance of 
these factors, we provide evidence here that the decrease in the number of births was mostly 
driven by economic considerations. The issue of whether women postponed, reduced their 
family size or whether more women remained childless is of interest but outside the scope of 
this paper, since our aim is to understand changes to the composition of the cohort of children 
born between 1991 and 19938.  
 
2.3.1 Access to birth control methods 
Most of the previous literature on fertility decisions and child outcomes has exploited 
policies which changed access to birth control, predominantly access to abortion. Here 
instead, we argue that access to birth control is unlikely to be an important factor in the 
sudden drop in the number of births9. First, access to birth control methods was very liberal in 
East Germany and the right to on-demand abortion was not modified before 1993, after which 
                                                            
8 As these delayed fertility issues could have changed the composition of individuals born after 1993, we will 
consider the robustness of our results to specifications which exclude these post treatment cohorts.   
9 Note also that the cohort of women coming to their peak fertility age after 1989 was relatively smaller - born 
during the fertility ebb of the early Seventies. This natural cohort size effect contributes to at the most 10 percent 
of the drop in the number of birth observed (Eberstadt [1994]). 
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it became more restricted10. Second, one could have expected that faced with the immediate 
uncertainty of a new environment, potential mothers would have terminated pregnancies in 
greater numbers.  We have already argued that the exact timing of the fertility drop (Figure 3) 
does not appear to support this idea in the very short run. Additionally, the number of 
terminations in the five East German Länder (excluding Berlin) dropped from 72,774 in 1988 
to 26,207 in 1994 (-63 percent). This more than matches the drop in the number of births 
observed over this period (-57 percent) which translates into a small decrease in the abortion 
to birth ratio.  We can thus safely say that the fall in fertility is mostly due to a fall in 
conceptions. This is important for two reasons. First, it implies that our ‘pre-treatment’ groups 
(of mothers and children) are not selected post-conception. Second, we can assume that the 
children eventually born must have been ‘wanted’ by their mothers at the time, which makes 
it a very different selection mechanism than when a drop in fertility is driven by the 
legalization of abortion, and the fewer ‘unwanted’ children in a cohort it implies.  
 
2.3.2 Internal migration  
One of the most important changes in the life of East Germans after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall was that direct migration to the more opulent West became possible again. A 
substantial number of individuals made use of this newfound freedom with almost 800,000 
individuals migrating from East to West, representing 5 percent of the pre-1991 population. 
This internal migration flow quickly died down, and by 1993 almost as many Germans were 
making the move in the opposite direction. Hunt (2006) demonstrates that improvements in 
relative wages were responsible for the ebbing of eastern migration. Movers were on average 
younger and more likely to be female (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln [2009]), and thus 
internal migration did have an impact on the reduction in the number of births in the East. 
                                                            
10 Sterilization became then available, however this contraception method was used by less than three percent of 
women (Rheinheckel et al [1998]). 
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Eberstadt (1994) estimates that internal migration accounted for about 10 percent of the total 
drop in birth numbers. This however does not really put in doubt the magnitude of the fertility 
drop since the crude birth rate used to illustrate it in Figures 1 and 2 uses number of women in 
the population as a denominator.   
Migration remains a worry for the validity of our identification, even if it does not 
directly explain the drop in fertility, since it could still distort the composition of the cohorts 
of individuals we observe in West Germany. This would be the case if mothers of young 
children migrated in substantial numbers or if many of the women who moved to the West 
subsequently gave birth there, but this is not observed in the raw data presented as West 
Germany birth numbers remain on trend. Our main crime outcome, arrest rate, is measured at 
the cohort level by state and could remain affected by the distorting effect of current or future 
mothers migrating. In a subsequent robustness check, we account for the fraction of women of 
childbearing age who have moved out of the state. Note, for our micro-level analysis, western 
migration is not an issue since we allocate the treatment status based on place of residence of 
the mother in 1989.  
 
2.3.3 Economic Uncertainty 
During the half-century of communist rule, there was no uncertainty concerning 
employment and wages, and women were very integrated into the labor force. The costs of 
having children were kept low due to the public provision of childcare, health and educational 
services. In the months immediately following the fall of the Berlin Wall, full employment 
policies were abandoned, and by the end of 1994 almost a third of the pre-unification jobs had 
been eliminated and 65 percent of those unemployed were women. The generous and 
universal benefits linked to having a child were quickly curtailed to match Western levels, 
while the availability of childcare shrank and housing costs surged (Rheinheckel et al. [1998]). 
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This negative economic picture was mitigated by the aforementioned rapid catch up of Eastern wages, 
which were negotiated to reach parity with the West by 1994, large financial transfers from the West, 
and a generous one to one conversion of the OstMark to the DeutscheMark in July 1990. In fact, by 
some measures individuals in the new Länder were economically ‘better off’ with disposable income 
and consumption on average already higher just three years after the fall of the Wall (Dornbusch and 
Wolf [1992]). Considering this, can we still argue that it is economic uncertainty that explains the 
drastic fall in the number of children being born? We believe so for two reasons.   
 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 
First, the economic situation and the associated uncertainties are likely to be important 
determinant of the timing of fertility decisions. The 1992 Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) 
allows us to link the perception of economic uncertainty to fertility decisions11. When asked in this 
survey what were the reasons for not wanting a(nother) child, the most common reason given by 78 
percent of East Germans was poor economic circumstances. The next two most common answers were 
also related to the perception of the economic situation: costs of raising children (60 percent) and fear 
of the future (49 percent). Additionally, the GSOEP allow us to track the evolution of the perception 
of economic situation and childcare provision over time. Figure 4 reports the difference between East 
and West Germany in the fraction of individuals worried about the economic situation. Following 
reunification, East Germans are 20 percentage points more likely to be very worried about the 
economy. This difference increases up to 30 percentage points in 1991 – before the views on the 
economy converged by 1993 and remain close thereafter. Amazingly, this is precisely when we start 
observing a rebound in birth rates in the East, which is consistent with our assumption that economic 
uncertainty was one of the main factors behind the drop in fertility in the east. Additionally, in 1991 
45% of East German workers asked about their probability of losing their jobs within the next 12 
                                                            
11 The Population Policy Acceptance Study (PPAS) is a comparative survey of European attitudes and opinions 
concerning demographic changes, demographic behaviours and population related policies. In Germany, the first 
survey was conducted in 1992. About 10,000 men and women in East and West Germany between the ages of 20 
and 39 years were asked about family policy, its impact and expectations on future family policies. For more on 
this survey see: http://www.bib-demografie.de/EN/Research/Surveys/PPAS/ppas_node.html 
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months reported that they would definitely or probably lose it. This probability is only 5% in West 
Germany. For East Germans, this perceived probability of job lost felt to 21% and 16% by 1993 and 
1996 respectively; while still higher than in the West, which remains around 8% in that period, this 
shows a remarkable convergence of perceptions within the three years following re-unification. 
Since the PPAS indicates that childcare was also an important concern, we also assess with the 
GSOEP the differences in the perception of childcare availability between East and West over time. 
Again we observe that East German parents are more worried about childcare but that they converge 
towards the West perception rapidly. These measures thus validate the definition of the CoW since by 
1993, the expectations about the economy and childcare of both East and West Germans have broadly 
converged. 
Second, what principally interests us is which women adjusted their fertility decision to this 
economic uncertainty. As such, the cohort composition is determined by the relative sizes of the 
income and substitution effects for different sub-groups. Perry (2004) argues that the income effect 
dominates for high wage earners while the substitution effect dominates for low wage earners. The 
former should therefore be more likely to stop having children during a recession while the latter will 
increase their fertility during bad economic times; as such the cohort composition/quality is pro-
cyclical. The massive fertility drop we study should have, following this logic, been mostly driven by 
women of higher socio-economic status deciding not to give birth as a response to economic 
uncertainty. We will later provide some empirical evidence supporting this heterogeneity in the 
response to economic uncertainty Consequently, relatively less well-off and less educated women 
became much more represented as mothers of these smaller cohorts. With this theoretical framework 
we can predict that the ‘Children of the Wall’ were the result of negative maternal selection as a 
response to high economic uncertainty.  
We next empirically test this assumption and try to understand the selection mechanism.  
 
3. Data Sources and Empirical Strategy 
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3.1 The Data 
3.1.1 State Level Data 
We obtained administrative crime data at the Land level on an annual basis from the 
Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA)12. Since our identification strategy relies on following 
the criminal activity of a specific cohort, we need information on the age of offenders. We 
thus use data on number of arrests by gender and per crime category13 from 1993 to 2011 for 
5 Eastern and 10 Western Länder (we exclude Berlin, the only state which straddles the old 
East/West border). This information is not available by discrete ages but only for the 
following – mostly  two year – age groups: 0-5, 6-7, 8-9, 10-11, 12-13, 14-15, 16-17, 18-20, 
21-22, 23-24, 25-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60+14. This slightly complicates our definition of 
‘Children of the Wall’ cohorts for the analysis as the CoW straddle age groups. For each 
period, we therefore compute an indicator of the proportion of each group that is treated. This 
indicator is 0 when the CoW is either too young or too old for the age group of interest. Since 
most of the age groups include two birth cohorts, we mostly have that for a given age group, 
half the individuals are treated when the CoW cohorts enters it, the full age group is 
considered treated the following two years, and half again three years later, as the CoW 
cohorts exit it. The values this indicator takes across years for the different age groups are 
reported in Table 1. This indicator is a simple weight of the proportion of an age group 
considered treated in each year15. The BKA also provided us with the number of active police 
                                                            
12 We are grateful to Daniel Focke from the Bundeskriminalamt (www.bka.de) for providing us with this data.  
13 We follow the standard BKA classification the 2010 Police Crime Statistics Yearbook – List of Offences 
(http://www.bka.de/nn_195196/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/Publications/PoliceCrimeStatistics/pks2010ListOfO
ffenses,templateId=raw,property=publicationFile.pdf/pks2010ListOfOffenses.pdf) to aggregate the more than 
400 sub-categories into five broad crime groups which together represent 85 percent of all arrests: violent and 
sexual; thefts and burglaries, fraud and forgery, criminal damage, and drug offences.    
14  Before the age of 14, the data refers to recorded incidents of ‘contact with the police’ rather than arrest which 
are not legal before this age in Germany 
15 These proportions do not take into account that the CoW cohorts were smaller and thus are likely to under-
estimate the treatment effect, nor that criminal propensity differs by age, within an age group. To solve this 
problem, we weight all regressions by Land/year age-group population. Note also that a Breutsch-Pagan test 
detected heteroscedasticity in the residuals of the un-weighted regression, the procedure recommended by Solon, 
Haider, and Wooldridge (2013) to empirically justify the use of group sample size weights to improve the 
precision of estimation.  
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personnel by year and Land for this period which, if changing, may affect the probability of 
arrest.  
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
We gathered a number of other important variables from the Federal Statistics Office to 
complete our State level panel dataset: population size by age, gender and nationality (to 
create our cohort size denominator and control for the influence that foreign migration could 
have on crime); and the overall and youth unemployment rates (to control for local economic 
conditions). Altogether the panel dataset we generate covers 15 age groups in 15 Länder over 
19 years and as such is made up of 4,275 age-state-year cells.  
 
3.1.2 Individual Level Data: The GSOEP 
The German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP) is a large longitudinal survey, carried out 
annually, of private households first established in West Germany in 1984. Since 1990, it also 
includes individuals from former East German Länder. We thus use data from 1990 to 2011 
comprising of more than 50,000 unique individuals, a quarter of whom lived in the East. The 
GSOEP includes detailed personal characteristics and extensive questionnaires for all 
members of the households, including retrospective information when necessary. The main 
survey is augmented by topic specific modules, and we make extensive use of the ones with 
survey questions focusing on mothers, young adult (aged 17), and risk preferences. The 
GSOEP unfortunately does not contain a single question on self-reported criminal 
participation16.  
 
                                                            
16 More information on the GSOEP is available at http://panel.gsoep.de/ 
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3.2 Empirical Strategy 
 For all outcomes our empirical strategy relies on a differences in differences approach 
which exploits the natural experiment provided by the post-Berlin Wall drop in birth rates. 
We compare the characteristics or outcomes of children who were born in East Germany in 
1991, 1992, and 1993, or of their mothers, to individuals born before 1991 (and after 1994 in 
a few cases). The counterfactual, or second difference, is provided by the non-treated 
individuals (or cohorts) from West German Länder which enable us to naturally control for 
common macro shocks and time trends. A necessary condition for this differences in 
differences identification approach to be valid is that the common trend hypothesis holds. We 
later carefully check that it does, providing graphical and econometric evidence. However, 
because of the nature and structure of our individual and cohort level data, we must define 
two different modeling strategies that depict our general differences in differences approach. 
 
3.2.1 Cohort Level Analysis - Crime 
As mentioned previously, the arrest data at the Land level is only available by year 
age-groups, and we compute an indicator of the fraction of the age group that is treated. Once 
interacted with being an Eastern Land, this becomes the main explanatory variable in our 
analysis which captures the proportion of ‘Children of the Wall’ in each cohort. ܲݎ݋݌ܥ݋ ௔ܹ௦௧, 
the subscripts a, s and t refer to respectively the age group, the Land, and the year. 
Our main outcome for measuring criminal participation is the arrest per 1,000 
inhabitants in the age group: Yast  defined as: 
ln /
1000
ast
ast ast
NY A      
where the numerator A is the number of arrestees, and the denominator N is the relevant 
population size. We then take the natural logarithm of this fraction to be able to later interpret 
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the estimated coefficient on Yast  as the elasticity in the arrest rate per 1,000 population of the 
age-group (a) in a Land (s) at time (t). This is first generated for all individuals and all arrests 
types but also separately by gender and for five distinct crime categories.  
We run various specifications of the basic model (1) to obtain the differences-in-
differences estimates of the criminal propensity of the ‘Children of the Wall’:  
 
௔ܻ௦௧ ൌ ߚܲݎ݋݌ܥ݋ ௔ܹ௦௧ ൅ ߜܼ௦௧ ൅ ߛܻݎ௧ ൅ ߩܣ݃݁௔ ൅ ߙ௦ ൅ ߝ௔௦௧  (1) 
 
ܲݎ݋݌ܥ݋ܹ is, as explained above, an interaction between an ex-GDR Länder indicator and the 
proportion in a specific age-group cohort that are born in 1991-1993. Age, Yr, and ߙ௦ are sets 
of dummies for age-group, year and Land respectively. We also include ܼ which is a set of 
time varying Land specific controls to account for local factors which may impact on criminal 
participation. These are specifically: overall and youth unemployment, proportion of foreign 
born per age group, and number of police personnel per 10,000 inhabitants. Each cell is 
weighted by the population size of the age-group, in the state for the year, and standard errors 
are then clustered at the Land level.  
 We conduct various robustness checks of estimates from this basic specification. to 
account for potential state specific unobservable characteristics (i.e. we relax the assumption 
of common trends between state and instead use Land specific linear time trends), ii) 
variations in the definition of the cohorts of interest and iii) assess the impact of internal 
migration. For the latter, we obtained yearly Land to Land population movement data by 
gender and age17 ii) we generated an indicator of ‘potential mothers migration’ which is the 
net number of women of reproductive age which moved out of state relative to its population 
                                                            
17  We are very indebted to the Federal Statistics Office (www.destatis.de) for providing us with this 
administrative dataset. Unfortunately this information only starts in 1991 for the Easter Länder which is 
admittedly just after the largest outflow had taken place. We still think that we can accurately capture which 
were the relatively highest sender and receiver Länder from this internal migration using this data.  
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relative to the number of women in the local population iii) include this variable as a control 
in our preferred crime specifications.  
 
3.2.2 Individual Level Analysis – Parental Selection and Children Non-Crime Outcomes 
To assess parental selection into motherhood and investigate children’s non-crime 
outcomes, we rely on individual level data from the GSOEP. For all these outcomes, we 
obtain estimates of β from slightly varying specifications of the following basic differences-
in-differences model: 
 ௜ܻ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚܥ݋ ௜ܹ ൅ ߛܧܽݏݐ௜ ൅ ߜܤ91_3௜ ൅ ߠܻ݋ܤ௜ ൅ ߩ ௜ܺ ൅ ߝ௜  (2) 
ܥ݋ܹ is a dummy for ‘Children of the Wall’ which is 1 if gave birth (or born) in the East 
between 1991 and 1993 and 0 otherwise. ܧܽݏݐ is a dummy for being in East Germany at birth 
or in 1991, B91_3 is a dummy for being born (having given birth) between 1991 and 1993, 
and YoB is a quadratic term of the year of birth to account for potential cohort effects. X is a 
vector of individual level characteristics which include, depending on the specification, for 
mothers: number of children, age, and years of education. For children the characteristics 
included are, depending on the model estimated: gender, number of siblings, years living in 
single mother household, and years of education. εi is an error term assumed to be 
independent and normally distributed across individuals i. All regressions are weighted by 
cohort size to account for the large changes in cohort sizes during the period and standard 
errors are always clustered by state18. 
                                                            
18 Clustering is a crucial issue here since the results from Donohue and Levitt (2001) were criticized by Joyce 
(2004) and Foote and Goetz (2008) for only being significant because of artificially low standard errors as a 
result of inappropriately clustering at the state*cohort level rather than just state. The argument is that a wider 
cluster better account better for potential correlation between cohorts and Foote and Goetz (2008) indeed show 
that using state only generates much larger standard errors. Here we tried both State and State*year of birth (as 
well as East*year of birth) as clusters. The former was constantly giving us larger standard errors indicating that 
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4. Criminal Participation of the ‘Children of the Wall’ 
 
4.1 Graphical Illustration 
Before turning to our statistical analysis, we illustrate graphically the evolution of criminal 
participation from 1993 to 2011 in East and West Germany using arrest rates for three 
distinctive age-groups. Figures 4 reports the arrest rates for individuals aged 6 to 7 (top 
graph), aged 10 to 11 (middle graph) and aged 16 to 17 (bottom graph). The plain/dotted lines 
are for East/West Germany, respectively and the vertical lines mark the year of arrival and 
departure of the ‘Children of the Wall’ cohorts from each specific age-group. As such they 
denote the period during which the proportion of cohort treated, as reported in Table 1, is 
positive. 
 
[Figure 5 about here] 
 
Overall, all graphs in Figure 5 indicate that youth arrest rates are almost always higher in 
East German Länder than in Western ones. This is well documented and perhaps not 
surprising considering the important differences in relative economic deprivation between the 
two parts of the country. It is however not a problem for our identification approach here 
since it is easy to account for this baseline crime gap by including Land specific fixed effects. 
What is crucial is that we have relatively similar trends in arrests between East and West 
Germany when the treated cohorts are not present, consistent with the common trend 
hypothesis. In that respect, the figures are quite striking and all reveal very marked ‘peaks’ in 
the arrest rate of East German cohorts when the cohorts born between 1991 and 1993 enter an 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
serial correlation is potentially not an important issue here. To be conservative with our results we therefore 
decided to report those throughout.  
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age group; such peaks are not observed in West Germany. Otherwise, the arrest rates in both 
regions follow similar paths. This pattern becomes increasingly pronounced as the cohorts 
become older and much larger arrest rates per population improve the precision of the 
graphs19.  
Figure 5 therefore clearly illustrates three things. First, that the criminal propensity of the 
‘Children of the Wall’ appears much higher than that of cohorts born before, a phenomena 
that we do not observe for their Western peers. Second, the lines depicting arrest rates of the 
pre-treatment cohorts in each age group in both regions are mostly parallel, especially for 
older age groups as arrest becomes more common, indicating that the common trend 
hypothesis is met. We indeed find that this is statistically the case when we test for the 
significance of a coefficient on differences in pre-trends which is small and non-significant20. 
Third, the increase in arrest observed for the CoW cohort is unlikely to be driven by 
unobserved time effects like changes in policing activity, since the effect is observed at 
different dates for the different age groups but always when the fraction of CoW in an age 
group is positive. 
 
4.2 Statistical Results 
4.2.1 Baseline Crime Results 
 We now move to our econometric analysis and Table 2 reports results from estimating 
various specifications of equation (1). The coefficients represent the elasticities of arrest rate 
to the fraction of ‘Children of the Wall’ in the cohort. They are presented to include 
sequentially: only age group, Land, and year dummies in column (1); time varying state 
controls in column (2); and Land specific time trends in column (3). Finally, the results are 
                                                            
19 Graphs for the other age groups reveal the same patterns and are available upon request 
20 We do this by regressing an interaction of East and being born before 1991 on arrest rates and this gives us a 
coefficient of -0.004 with an associated standard error of 0.007.  
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reported alternatively for all age groups in row (i) and only for individuals under 21s in row 
(ii), as older adults may not be a good control for youth offending behavior; indeed since peak 
criminal activity increases sharply up to age 19 and decreases thereafter, including older 
adults would likely over-estimate the effect. The estimated coefficients are all large, very 
significant, and not significantly different from one another across specifications (when using 
the same sample of individuals). These results confirm that the ‘Children of the Wall’ 
engaged disproportionally more in criminal activity and that this is equally true for men and 
women. Looking at the most conservative estimates, the fullest specifications for under 21s 
only (i.e. column (3) of row (ii)), we can conclude that the ‘Children of the Wall’ are 42.5 
percent more likely to participate in criminal activity than their older/younger and Western 
peers. Surprisingly, the effect is also remarkably similar for both men and women, the later, a 
group for which criminality has been under-studied because their relatively low participation 
rate. The high criminality of the CoW indicates that as expected, this cohort is negatively 
selected, and despite its small size, commits a disproportionally high amount of crime.  
   
[Table 2 about here] 
 
4.2.2 Results by Crime Category and Gender 
 In Table 3 we report the results for our preferred specification, by crime category for 
all individuals under 21 in row (i), for men in row (ii), and women in row (iii). The numbers 
in square brackets are the average arrest rates per 1,000 population  of under 21s for each 
crime type. We note that most arrests are for three crime categories (theft and burglary, 
violent and sexual, and criminal damage), with the first category alone representing almost 50 
percent of arrests. Men are on average arrested much more than women (three times more for 
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theft and burglary and nine times more for Criminal Damage). The estimated coefficients of 
the effect of being born as part of the CoW cohort are large and quite precisely estimated for 
all crimes except for drug offences. The effect is not statistically different between each crime 
category, reflecting that all arrests are similarly affected by the CoW cohorts, which is 
comforting as this suggests that our results are not driven by a specific crime which may have 
been targeted by the police force and that the CoW cohort would have been disproportionally 
engaged in. Interestingly, these estimates are again very similar for women and men. Since 
women commit a small fraction of crimes this again confirms that our results are unlikely to 
be driven by police force strategies specifically targeting the CoW cohort. These results 
further confirm that the ‘Children of the Wall’ have very unusually high probability of being 
arrested and that this is true for most crime categories and across genders.  
   
[Table 3 about here] 
 
4.2.3 Robustness of Crime Results 
 Before we investigate the mechanisms behind this sharp rise in arrest for the CoW 
cohort, we report in Table 4 the results from a series of robustness checks based on our 
favored specification. First, in row 1, to account for internal migration, we include for each 
year and age group a measure of the net proportion of potential mothers who moved from 
Land to Land. Once included in our preferred specification, we find that, while significant by 
itself, migration only very marginally affects our estimate: 0.423 (0.078) when included 
compared to 0.425 (0.075) before. This is relatively strong evidence that internal migration is 
not the driving mechanism behind our results.  
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[Table 4 about here] 
 
 In the next specification, row 2, we eliminate the few cohorts born after 1993, from 
the analysis, as these could be considered treated, since if better parents postponed their 
fertility decisions between 1991 and 1993, they may catch-up when the uncertainty is 
reduced, and subsequent cohorts would be positively selected. Indeed, excluding those 
increases the estimated elasticity to 0.596 (0.148). In rows 3 and 4, we further tighten the 
window of cohorts used as controls and only keep those born at most six and three years 
before the CoW respectively. This is akin to framing our estimates into a discontinuity design 
to ensure that treated and control individuals are as similar as possible which entails here that 
they mostly faced the same environment when growing up in reunified Germany. The 
resulting estimates are larger and significant and for the smaller window we find that 
‘Children of the Wall’ have on average a 50 percent higher arrest rates than individuals born 
just three years before.  
 The next two rows of Table 4 report estimates when we alter the definition of CoW. 
As explained above, children born from August 1990 were conceived after the collapse of the 
Wall and as such the 1990 cohort is partially treated. When we consider all children born in 
1990 in the East as also treated individuals (row 5), the estimate shrinks to 0.342 (0.058), due 
to measurement error in the treatment variable, but this is not statistically different from the 
baseline estimate. In row 6, we expand the definition of CoW to include children born in 
1994, as the rebound in birth number started in that year, this brings us back almost exactly to 
our original estimate.  
 Finally, in the final specification of Table 4, we present a placebo test where we 
assume that the treated cohorts were those born between 1987 and 1989 and drop all the 
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subsequent cohorts. If the environment young children were exposed to after the collapse of 
the Berlin Wall had an effect on crime, we should find some effect on arrest later in life for 
these cohorts born just before the collapse of the communist regime. We reject this 
assumption as the placebo estimate is not statistically significant and with a coefficient eight 
times smaller than in our baseline estimate. All these robustness check are very reassuring as 
to the validity of our results and we now consider them in perspective to previous findings in 
this literature.   
 
4.2.4 Our Crime Results in Perspective 
 Our results confirm the Donohue and Levitt (2001) hypothesis that fertility decisions 
can have a large effect on the subsequent criminal activity of children. We find that the 
cohorts of children born in East Germany between 1991 and 1993 commit a much greater 
fraction of crime than would be expected, which is consistent with the interpretation of 
negative parental selection. This is despite being part of much smaller cohorts, which in 
theory should have a positive effect on outcomes (e.g., via smaller class sizes and lower 
competition on the labor market). Legalization of abortion in the U.S. resulted in fewer 
children being born from mothers with relatively worse parental characteristics, as such it was 
impossible to distinguish the potential positive effect on child outcomes of smaller cohort size 
from the effect of positive selection into fertility. Those estimates were thus over-estimates of 
the parental selection effect. The bias may indeed be large, and for Romania, Pop-Eleches 
(2006) estimated that 50% of the effect of abortion may be due to cohort size21. Here, we are 
unable to separate the cohort size from parental selection effects but since the two effects 
                                                            
21 The Romanian abortion ban studied by Pop-Eleches (2006) resulted in larger cohorts of positively selected 
children and could have naturally led to underestimates of the fertility selection effect. The author however 
prefers to control for socio-economic composition of mothers to show that the ban led to worse outcomes for 
children. He therefore shows that the larger cohort size effect (or crowding out effect as it is called in this paper) 
goes in the same direction as the treatment effect and therefore attempts to measure its importance.  
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operate in opposite directions, we can argue that, our estimates on criminal activity presented 
above represent a lower bound of the true impact of fertility selection on the offending 
behavior of the child generation. 
 Our most conservative estimates state that the arrest rate of this cohort is 40 percent 
higher than expected. These are large effects but they are actually consistent with Donohue 
and Levitt (2001, 2004, 2009) who concluded that the legalization of abortion was responsible 
for 50 percent of the drop in crime observed in the U.S. in the 1990s22. Our results do not 
however entail that overall crime will increase in East Germany. First, the ‘Children of the 
Wall’ reached the peak offending age of 19-20 (in 2010-2013), and second, they represent a 
small fraction of the total number of arrests, being only three birth-year cohorts and being 50 
percent smaller than usual birth year cohorts. However, as the increase in arrest almost 
matches the reduction in cohort size, we expect that overall crime will ‘not fall’ much . 
Despite the small size of the CoW cohort, the overall arrest rates felt only from 8.6 in 2005 to 
7.7 in 2011 in East Germany, the latest year for which data is available. Since it did not lead 
to the same aggregate changes in crime as in the US, the very high propensity of the ‘Children 
of the Wall’ to commit offences has until now remained unnoticed and has yet to enter the 
policy debate. This does not change the value of our findings which are perhaps the most 
robust evidence to date that parental selection has a very strong effect on child offending 
behaviour.  
 In the next section we turn to micro level data to document the negative selection 
process and to explore a number of underlying mechanisms that may explain why the 
‘Children of the Wall’ are so prone to committing crimes, 
.  
                                                            
22 Since the country, the identification and the population affected are different, the similarity with the U.S. 
results was rather unexpected. 
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5. The Fertility-Crime Relationship: Mechanisms 
5.1 Parental Selection 
 As already discussed, the large fertility drop we study is certainly not random across 
women and is likely to be driven by parental selection. Our prior, after reviewing the evidence 
on the criminal activity of the ‘Children of the Wall’, is that they were the product of 
important negative selection into motherhood. Faced with a high level of uncertainty about 
the future and a new set of (unknown) constraints regarding the costs of child rearing, women 
with relatively lower parenting skills were relatively more likely to conceive and give birth in 
the years following the collapse of the Communist regime.  
 To test this hypothesis we now turn to the GSOEP data and focus on the sub-sample of 
women who gave birth in East or West Germany between 1980 and 2000. Note that the 
GSOEP provides retrospective information on location in 1990, which we use to allocate the 
CoW status so that these estimates are not affected by subsequent migration decisions. We 
begin by using equation (2) to compare the mothers of the ‘Children of the Wall’ on a number 
of ‘positive’ socio-economic characteristics to those of other mothers, and report the results in 
Table 5. First, we note that East German mothers over this period are on average quite 
different to their Western peers; this is captured by the strongly significant coefficients on the 
‘Birth East’ dummy. Additionally, the mothers of CoW are on average over 10 months 
younger, have almost one year less of education, and are 11 percentage points less likely to 
have completed high school. At the time of survey completion, they were also respectively 9 
and 12 percentage points less likely to be in a stable relationship or economically active. 
These results clearly indicate that our prior was correct and women who had children during 
the very uncertain times following the fall of the Berlin Wall were negatively selected on all 
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the standard socio-economic characteristics which are associated with relatively lower 
parental skills.  
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 Negative parental selection of the ‘Children of the Wall’ cohorts is very apparent, but 
can it be linked to economic uncertainty in this period as we argued? To do this, we consider 
whether there is heterogeneity by education in women’s fertility response to the negative 
perception of the economic situation. Practically, we regress the probability of having a child 
in the period 1991/93 , for all women aged 17 to 47 interviewed in the GSOEP , on a measure 
of economic uncertainty in year t-1 (i.e. dummy for being ‘very worried’ about ‘the general 
economic development’)23. We find that uncertainty is negatively related to fertility, as might 
have been expected. We then include an interaction of years of education and economic 
uncertainty in the probability model we estimate. This interaction is negative and significant. 
Figure 6, reports the estimated probability of giving birth and the associated confidence 
interval, by education level and level of worry about the economy. More worried women 
(solid line) and more educated women are less likely to give birth. What Figure 6 clearly 
shows is that the fertility decision of less educated women is not significantly affected by 
economic uncertainty. On the contrary, highly educated women’s fertility drops when worried 
about the economy. For the most educated, very worried women are 2.5 times less likely to 
have a child than less worried one.. This evidence reinforces our argument that the parental 
selection we have documented works through economic uncertainty perception as the fertility 
                                                            
23 The model also includes education, age and year dummies and the standard errors are clustered at East level to 
account for important common age shocks on fertility which are likely to be different between East and West 
Germany.  
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of mothers with disproportionally unfavorable characteristics is less responsive to socio-
economic shocks. 
   
[Figure 6 about here] 
  
5.2 Children’s Criminal Behaviour: School or Parents? 
 While the cohort level evidence has strongly shown that the ‘Children of the Wall’ are 
much more likely to be arrested, we now explore whether they also differ on other observable 
non-crime outcomes; to assess whether those would also be consistent with negative parental 
selection. We do this by using GSOEP information collected when individuals are aged 1724 
and implementing the model described in equation (2). The education variables reported in 
Table 6 are somewhat limited since at age 17 German pupils are mostly all enrolled in 
education; as such it is unsurprising that there is no difference in the probability of CoW of 
being a school drop-out. They are however five percentage points more likely to have 
repeated a grade by that age, and almost a quarter of them self-report below average scores in 
math and German. Overall, the difference in educational attainment is suggestive that the 
‘Children of the Wall’ also have negative outcomes in other dimensions but not as strong as 
the arrest evidence. A first explanation is that these youths are still too young and that 
achievement gaps may only become clear once they leave education at age 18. The repeater 
and test score result suggest this is likely to happen. Secondly, small cohort size effects (i.e. 
                                                            
24 The last GSOEP survey available is from 2011 which means that the last individuals who completed this 
special module were born in 1994. Consequently we only have one cohort in our control group which is born 
after the fertility shock subsided.  
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smaller classes) may have had a positive impact on educational attainment and could have 
partially compensated for the poorer parental input25.  
 While the rest of the literature has relied on the socio-economic characteristics of 
mothers to argue for the parental selection mechanism, we investigate this issue more directly, 
and arguably more objectively, by relying on information on parental skills and maternal 
relationship. The GSOEP provides a unique opportunity to test the quality of parental skills 
with a survey supplement at age 17 containing a battery of questions about emotional 
perception, such as listing people who have been important persons in the child’s life26. The 
last three columns of Table 6 report the evidence on maternal relationship. On average, 94 
percent of the sample reports that their mother has been an important figure throughout their 
life, but children born in East Germany just after the fall of the Berlin Wall are 11 percentage 
points less likely to make this statement. Another strong indicator of maternal attachment is 
whether these teenagers feel loved by their mothers27. Our estimate suggests that the CoW are 
14 percentage points less likely to be in this category suggesting much lower lever of maternal 
attachment. Finally, we use an overall measure of ‘supportive parenting’ that is a multi-item 
scale of nine questions28 to gauge parental participation in a child's life and how much the 
parent involves the child in decision making. This exercise reveals that the ‘Children of the 
Wall’ are almost 30 percentage points less likely to say that they have supportive mothers. 
While it is possible that the criminal activity of the children has reduced the maternal 
involvement in their upbringing, we later provide evidence infirming this hypotheses, and 
thus supporting a causal interpretation of these results. 
                                                            
25 Kempkes (2010) suggests that while resources decreased with cohort size in East Germany over the period 
1993 to 2006, the teacher/student ratio improved by 25%. 
26 The original question is a 4-points scale answer which we dichotomize by grouping ‘important’ and ‘very 
important’ categories and the ‘less important’ and ‘not important at all’ ones together. 
27 They are asked if their “Mother Shows that she Loves you” and have five possible answers going from ‘very 
often’ (45 percent) to ‘never’ (1 percent). We generate a dummy variable which is one if the youths respond 
‘very often’ and zero otherwise.  
28 The original conceptualization of this measure of supportive parenting was proposed by Simons et al (1992) 
and its application to the GSOEP is described in Weinhardt and Schupp (2011) 
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[Table 6 about here] 
 
 These results generally hint to the important role potentially played by a poor maternal 
relationship in explaining the abnormal levels of criminal participation observed. This is 
perhaps not surprising as low level of parental support or even parental rejection have been 
associated to higher level of delinquency (see Hoeve et al. [2009] and references therein). 
What is interesting is to note that we might have assumed that women who chose to give birth 
during very uncertain economic times might have really wanted a child. Otherwise, they could 
have made use of abortion, a birth control widely available at the time, to avoid that an 
‘unwanted’ conception led to a birth.  These initially ‘wanted’ children later have poor 
relationships with their mother, which may account for why they commit many more 
offences. However, we still need to understand why these mothers chose to have these 
children at that time.   
 
5.3 Intergenerational Risk Attitude 
 An important dimension that could link parental fertility decision and criminal activity 
of children, which surprisingly has not been previously mentioned in the literature, is risk 
attitude. A preference for risky behavior has long been associated with most unsafe youth 
activities (Gruber [2001]), and recent literature has pointed out the importance of risk attitude 
in predicting many individual economic outcomes (Dohmen et al [2011]). We therefore 
exploit the very detailed risk attitude information contained in the GSOEP to test if this plays 
an important role in the fertility-crime relationship. We obtain estimates on various measures 
of risk attitude, using models presented in (2), for both mothers and children, and the results 
are presented in Table 7.  
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[Table 7 about here] 
 
 Mothers who gave birth in East Germany just after the fall of the Berlin Wall have a 
greater preference for risk. Both for overall risk Level (willingness to take risk in life rated 
from 0 to 10) and Risk Lover (risk level above 5) we obtain strongly positive and significant 
coefficient for these women, even after controlling for age and education29. Overall risk 
attitude can have positive or negative consequences for economic outcomes as, for example, 
entrepreneurs are on average more risk lover individuals. To address this, we propose to use 
the questionnaire of activity specific risk which make it possible to clearly differentiate 
between potential ‘bad’ and ‘good’ risky behavior30. ‘Bad’ risk is defined from answers to the 
willingness to take risk with own health and while driving. ‘Good’ risk is measured as the 
willingness to take financial risk. The results are here striking as it emerges that it is only with 
regards to taking more ‘bad risk’, and not ‘good risk’, that the mothers of CoW significantly 
differ from their peers.  
 Turning to the ‘Children of the Wall’ themselves in the last three columns of Table 7, 
we find that on all measures (level and lover) they are more willing to take risk than their 
older/Western peers 31 . This might have been expected as criminal behavior could be 
considered to be the risky behavior outcome par excellence. These findings also indirectly 
confirm what Dohmen et al. (2012) have recently shown: that parents transmit preferences for 
risk to their children. This transmission of risk preferences is an important mechanism of the 
                                                            
29 We are actually not the first to report this link as Schmitt (2012) documented that individuals with higher 
levels of willingness were more likely to have had children in East Germany after the end of communism.   
30 This question was asked only twice and not recently enough (last year 2009) to have the equivalent data for 
children in the treated cohorts we are interested.  
31 An interesting side finding here also stems from the coefficient on the East dummy we report: significant for 
mothers but not for their children. It appears to confirm the assumption put forward by Alesina and Fuchs-
Schündel (2007) of a convergence of preferences between East and West Germans within a generation as 
individual exposure to communism decreases.  
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parental selection/criminal activity relationship that has until now been ignored. The women 
who gave birth at a time of great economic uncertainty were more risk takers, a trait they 
transmitted to their children, who then becomes more likely to engage in criminal activities. 
Moreover, these mothers had poor parental skills, so despite being wanted, these children are 
negatively selected. 
 
5.4 ‘Bad’ Mothers or ‘Bad’ Times? Sibling Evidence 
 Finally despite the evidence of parental selection, the differences in the characteristics 
and behavior of the ‘Children of the Wall’ could also be consistent with the fetal 
programming (Barker [1995]) and early life adversity (Conti et al. [ 2012]) hypotheses. Aizer, 
Stroud, and Buka (2009), for example, show that maternal stress in utero has long term 
negative consequences for children, and that this effect is stronger for low socio-economic 
status mothers. Due to the high level of uncertainty faced by the mothers after the collapse of 
the Wall, these children would have experienced heightened levels of stress in the womb and 
in their very early years. This could have shaped their preferences and behaviour in a way to 
cope with such a world. As such, we could expect higher risk preference, lower emotional 
attachment and greater criminal probability; i.e. all our findings would no results from these 
children having had ‘bad’ parents but from being born in ‘bad’ economic times.  
While our results that the mothers of CoW have worse observable and parental skills 
could be hard to reconcile with this theory alone, we carry out another test of the early life 
adversity hypothesis. To do so we identified all older siblings of individuals born between 
1991 and 1993 in East Germany and estimate their maternal relationship and risk attitude as in 
equation (2). These older siblings could not have been “programmed” since they were born 
before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and, in the absence of negative parental selection, they 
36 
 
should not report different outcomes to other children. Siblings are also informative for the 
causal interpretation of the evidence on the selection mechanism that we have presented so 
far. One could argue that the lower maternal involvement on the CoW is due to their criminal 
activity. However, since the older siblings of CoW are not more likely to engage in criminal 
activity, we should not expect that they report lower maternal involvement, unless they were 
also negatively selected.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
Indeed,  Table 8 reports that the older siblings of CoW have as poor maternal 
relationship as their younger siblings and are also more willing to take risk than their peers. 
This strongly supports that the observed effects for the CoW are due to negative parental 
selection and not to fetal programming, which we reject as the underlying mechanism behind 
our findings; i.e. the CoW cohort is disproportionally composed of children whose mother had 
higher preference for risk, lower parenting skills and lower observable characteristics 
associated with positive outcomes for the children. 
   
7. Conclusion 
This paper highlights the effects of parental selection on the subsequent criminal 
activity of children. While previous literature has relied on changes to the abortion laws as 
exogenous fertility shocks, we use the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 which led to a 50 
percent drop in fertility over a three years period in East Germany and a change in the 
composition of the cohort. We report that children born in East Germany in the aftermath of 
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the regime change are at least 40 percent more likely to be arrested than those from previous 
cohorts. Since the fertility shock is local and temporary, we can exclude that the changes in 
arrest rate is not due to the parental selection associated with the fertility shock. Another 
advantage of our strategy is that since the cohort size and the parental selection effects go in 
opposite directions, our estimate of the parental selection effect is a lower bound. This large 
increase in criminality is consistent with either negative parental selection or some kind of 
cohort specific shock (maybe fetal programming). We find consistent evidence supporting 
negative parental selection, importantly we improve on the literature by demonstrating that 
mothers of CoW are more risk lovers and are rated as providing worse emotional attachment 
to their children. We also note that the older siblings of CoW also rate the emotional 
attachment of their parents poorly and also have a higher preference for risk, consistently with 
negative parental selection, but not with a cohort specific effect. To paraphrase Donohue and 
Levitt (2001), it is not so much that the ‘Children of the Wall’ were unwanted, but mostly that 
their mothers could not care enough. 
Our findings on the large effects of parental selections have important implications for 
policy planners. Rather than base the decisions regarding public investment on cohort size 
only, there is scope for adjusting these investments for cohort quality. In this case, despite its 
small size, this cohort would have benefited from additional investment to compensate for the 
lower average quality of their parents. Strikingly, the rise in arrest for the CoW cohort starts 
as early as age 6. As such, any interventions to compensate for the “bad” parental skills would 
have to be very early in childhood; consistent with the suggestions of Cunha and Heckman 
(2007) or Heckman et al (2010). Interventions when preferences are still malleable may break 
the intergenerational transmission of preferences, such as risk, which have an important role 
to play in criminal activity. However, identifying the children at risk is potentially difficult. 
While their mothers differ by some observable characteristics, they also largely differ along 
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unobservable characteristics like risk preference and emotional attachment, which would 
make targeting challenging. Recent experimental evidence on the impact of home visiting 
programs aimed at risk mothers and their family which start even before the birth of the child, 
such as Preparing for Live in Dublin (Doyle et al [2013]) and Pro Kind in Germany (Sandner 
[2012]), are promising. The real challenge remains to find a way to target efficiently such 
interventions at the right mothers/children and, in that respect, we believe the findings from 
this research can be useful. 
 
ROYAL HOLLOWAY, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, CEE, ROA AND IZA 
MAASTRICHT UNIVERSITY, CEP, ROA, AND CESIFO 
 
39 
 
References: 
Aizer, Anna, Laura Stroud, and Stephen Buka, “Maternal Stress and Child Outcomes: 
Evidence from Siblings”, NBER Working Paper No. w18422, 2009. 
Alesina, Alberto, and Nicola Fuchs-Schündeln, “Goodbye Lenin (or Not?): The Effect of 
Communism on People’s Preferences,” American Economic Review, 97 (2007), 1507-
1528. 
Ananat, Elizabeth Oltmans, Jonathan Gruber, Phillip Levine, and Douglas Staiger “Abortion 
and Selection,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 (2009), 124-136. 
Barker, David J.P., “Fetal Origins of Coronary Heart Disease,” British Medical Journal, 311 
(1995), 171-174. 
Bhaumik, Sumon Kumar, and Jeffery Nugent, “Real Options and Demographic Decision: 
Empirical Evidence from East and West Germany,” Applied Economics, 43 (2011), 
2739-2749. 
Burchardi, Konrad and Tarek Hassan, “The Economic Impact of Social Ties: Evidence from 
German Reunification,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128 (2013), 1219-1271. 
Burstyn, Leonardo and Davide Cantoni, “A Tear in the Iron Curtain: The Impact of Western 
Television on Consumption Behavior,” CEPR Discussion Paper No 2012-19, 2012. 
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, and Melvin Stephens, “Abortion legalization and Adolescent Substance 
use,”  Journal of Law and Economics, 49 (2006), 481-505. 
Conrad, Christof, Michael Lechner, and Welf Werner, “East German fertility after unification: 
crisis or adaptation?” Population and Development Review, 22 (1996), 331- 358. 
Conti, Gabriella, Christopher Hansman, James J. Heckman, Matthew F. X. Novak, Angela 
Ruggiero, Stephen J. Suomi, “Primate Evidence on the Late Health Effects of Early 
40 
 
Life Adversity,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science, 109 (2012), 8866-
8871. 
Cook, Phillip, and John Laub, “After the Epidemic: Recent Trends in Youth Violence in the 
United States,” in Crime and Justice: A Review of Research, Michael Tonry ed. ( 
Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002)  
Cunha, Flavio, and James Heckman, “The Technology of Skill Formation,” American 
Economic Review, 97 (2007), 31-47. 
Dehejia, Rajeev, and Adriana Lleras-Muney, “Booms, Busts and Babies’ Health,” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 119 (2004), 1091-1130. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, and Uwe Sunde, “The Intergenerational 
Transmission of Risk and Trust Attitudes,” Review of Economic Studies, 79 (2012), 
645-677. 
Dohmen, Thomas, Armin Falk, David Huffman, Uwe Sunde, Jürgen Schupp, and Gert G. 
Wagner, “Individual Risk Attitudes: Measurement, Determinants and Behavioral 
Consequences,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 9 (2011), 522-550. 
Donohue, John J. III, Jeffrey Grogger, and Steven D. Levitt “The Impact of Legalized 
Abortion on Teen Childbearing”, American Law and Economics Review, 11 (2009), 
24-46. 
Donohue, John J. III, and Steven D. Levitt, “The impact of legalized abortion on crime,” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116 (2001),  379-420. 
Donohue, John J. III, and Steven D. Levitt, “Further evidence that legalized Abortion 
Lowered Crime: A reply to Joyce,” Journal of Human Resources, 29 (2004), 29-49. 
41 
 
Donohue, John J. III, and Steven D. Levitt, “Measurement Error, Legalized Abortion, and the 
Decline in Crime: A response to Foote and Goetz,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
123 (2008), 425-440. 
Dornbusch, Rudiger and Holger C. Wolf, “East German Economic Reconstruction,” in The Transition 
in Eastern Europe, Volume 1, Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth A. Froot, and Jeffrey D. Sachs ed. 
(Chicago IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).  
Doyle, Orla, Colm Harmon, James J. Heckman, Caitriona Logue, and Seong Moon, “Measuring the 
Investment in Human Capital Formation: An Experimental Analysis of Early Life Outcomes”, 
NBER Working Paper No. w19316, 2013. 
Eberstadt, Nicholas, “Demographic Shocks After Communism: Eastern Germany 1989-
1993,” Population and Development Review, 20 (1994), 137-152. 
Foote, Christopher, and Christopher Goetz, “The Impact of Legalized Abortion on Crime: 
Comment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 123 (2008), 407-423. 
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola, “The Response of Household Saving to the Large Shock of German 
Reunification,”  American Economic Review, 98 (2008)., 1798-1828. 
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola, and Matthias Schündeln, “Precautionary Savings and Self-
Selection: Evidence for the German Reunification ‘Experiment’,” Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, 120 (2005), 1085-1120. 
Fuchs-Schündeln, Nicola, and Matthias Schündeln, ”Who stays, who goes, who returns? East-
West Migration within Germany since Reunification,” Economics of Transition, 17 
(2009) 703-738. 
Gruber, Jonathan, ed., Risky Behavior among Youth: An Economic Analysis (Chicago IL: 
University of Chicago Press). 
42 
 
Gruber, Jonathan, Phillip B. Levine, and Douglas Staiger, “Abortion Legalization and Child 
Living Circumstances: Who Is the ‘Marginal Child’,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, 114 (1999), 263–292. 
Heckman, James J., Seong Hyeok Moon, Rodrigo Pinto, Peter A. Sevleyev and Adam Yavitz, 
“The Rate of Return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program,” Journal of Public 
Economics, 94 (2010), 114-128. 
Hjalmarsson, Randi, and Matthew Lindquist, “Like Godfather, Like Son: Exploring the 
Intergenerational Nature of Crime,” Journal of Human Resources, 47 (2012), 550-582. 
Hoeve, Machteld, Judith Semon Dubas, Veroni Eichelsheim, Peter van der Laan, Wilma 
Smeenk and Jan Gerris. “The Relationship Between Parenting and Delinquency: A 
meta-Analysis,” Journal of Abnormal Child Psychology, 73 (2009), 749-775. 
Hunt, Jennifer, “Staunching Emigration from East Germany: Age and the Determinants of 
Migration,” Journal of the European Economic Association, 4 (2006), 1014-1037. 
Joyce, Ted, “Did Legalized Abortion Lower Crime?” Journal of Human Resources, 39 
(2004), 1-28. 
Joyce, Ted, “A Simple Tests of Abortion and Crime,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91 
(2009), 112-123. 
Judt, Tony, Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945, (London, UK: Pimlico). 
Kreyenfeld, Michela, “Uncertainties in Femal Employmnet Careers and the Postponement of 
Parenthood in Germany,” European Sociological Review, 26 (2010), 351-366. 
Kempkes, Gerhard “Rapid Demographic Change and the Allocation of Public Education 
Resources: Evidence from East Germany”, Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion Paper 
No. 16/2010, 2010. 
43 
 
Perry, Cynthia, “How do Female Earnings Affect Fertility Decisions?” Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology, PhD Thesis, 2004. 
Pop-Eleches, Christian, “The impact of an abortion ban on socioeconomic outcomes of 
children: Evidence from Romania,” Journal of Political Economy, 114 (2006), 744-
773. 
Reinheckel, Antje, Kornelia Frank, Wolfgang Weise, and Bernt-Peter Robra, “Effect of Re-
Unification on Fertility Behaviour in East Germany: A Review of the Evidence 
Reproductive,” Health Matters, 6 (1998), 122-128. 
Rindfuss, Ronald R., John Shelton Reed, and Craig St. John, “A Fertility Reaction to a 
Historical Event: Southern White Birth Rates and the 1954 Desegregation Ruling,” 
Science, 201 (1978), 178-180. 
Sandner, Malte, “Effects of Early Child Intervention on Child Development and Early Skill 
Formation. Evidence from a Randomized Controlled Trial,” Hannover University 
Discussion Paper No 518, 2012.  
Sampson, Robert J. and John H. Laub, Crime in the Making: Pathways and Turning Points 
through Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press). 
Schmitt, Christian, “Gerburten in Ost- und Westdeutschland: erleichtert eine hohe 
Risikobereitschaft die Entscheidung für ein Kind?” DIW Discussion Paper No. 
11.2012,   2012. 
Sen, Anindya, “Does Increased Abortion Lead to Lower Crime? Evaluating the Relationship 
between Crime, Abortion and Fertility,” B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and 
Policy, 7 (2007), 48. 
44 
 
Simons, Ronald L., Frederick O. Lorenz, Rand D. Conger and Chyi-In Wu, “Support from 
Spouse as Mediator and Moderator of the Disruptive Influence of Economic Strain on 
Parenting,” Child Development, 63 (1992), 1282-1301. 
Sobotka, Tomás, Vegard Skirbekk, and Dimiter Philipov, “Economic Recession and Fertility 
in the Developed World,” Population and Development Review, 37 (2011), 267-306. 
Solon, Gary, Steven Haider and Jeffrey Wooldridge, “What Are We Weighting For?”, NBER 
Working Paper No. w18859, 2013. 
Tracy, Paul E., Marvin E. Wolfgang and Robert M. Figlio, Delinquency Careers in Two Birth 
Cohorts. (New York, NY: Plenum Press). 
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, “Fertility Decline in the Transition 
Economics, 1989-1998: Economic and Social Factors Revisited,” Economic Survey of 
Europe, 1 (2000), 189-207. 
van den Bergh, Bea, Eduard Mulder, Maarten Mennes and Vivette Glover, “Antenatal 
Maternal Anxiety and Stress and the Neurobehavioural Development of the Foetus 
and Child: Links and Possible Mechanisms. A review,” Neuroscience and 
Biobehavioral Reviews, 29 (2005) 237–258. 
 
Witte, James C. and Gert G. Wagner, “Declining Fertility in East Germany After Unification: 
A Demographic Response to Socioeconomic Change,” Population and Development 
Review, 21 (1995): 387-397 
Weinhardt, Michael and Jürgen Schupp, “Multi-Itemskalen im SOEP Jugendfragebogen,” 
DIW Technical Report 60/2011, 2011. 
 
  
45 
 
Table 1 – Proportion of ‘Children of the Wall’ by Crime Age Groups from 1993 to 2011 
 
Age 
Group/  
Year 
Under 
6 6-7 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17 18-20 21-22 
1993 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1994 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1995 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1996 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1997 1/3 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1998 1/6 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
1999 0 1 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2000 0 1/2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2001 0 0 1 1/2 0 0 0 0 0 
2002 0 0 1/2 1 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 0 0 0 1 1/2 0 0 0 0 
2004 0 0 0 1/2 1 0 0 0 0 
2005 0 0 0 0 1 1/2 0 0 0 
2006 0 0 0 0 1/2 1 0 0 0 
2007 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/2 0 0 
2008 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 1 0 0 
2009 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1/3 0 
2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 1/2 2/3 0 
2011 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 Note: ‘Children of the Wall’ are defined as being born in an Eastern Länder between 1991 and 1993. 
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Table 2 – Change in Overall Arrest Rates of ‘Children of the Wall’ Cohorts 
for All Age Groups, for Under 21s Only, and by Gender 
 
 Log Arrest Rate 
Proportion of Cohort  
that are CoW 
All Men Women 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
i - All Age Groups 
    [ N = 4,275] 
0.733*** 
(0.083) 
0.637*** 
(0.083) 
0.634*** 
(0.081) 
0.637*** 
(0.112) 
0.638*** 
(0.084) 
ii –Under 21s Only 
     [ N = 2,280] 
0.568*** 
(0.046) 
0.500*** 
(0.084) 
0.425*** 
(0.089) 
0.418*** 
(0.081) 
0.480*** 
(0.072) 
Age Group,  Land, and 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Land Time Varying 
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Land Specific Time 
Trends No No Yes Yes Yes 
 
Note: The Land time varying controls are annual measures of overall unemployment, youth unemployment rates; proportion 
foreign born by age groups; and number of police officers per 1,000 population. Robust standard error clustered at the Land level 
in parenthesis. Estimates are weighted by population size. *, **, and *** denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 5 percent 
level. 
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Table 3 – Change in Crime Specific Arrest Rates of ‘Children of the Wall’ Cohorts for Under 21s Only, by Gender 
 
 Log Arrest Rate 
Proportion of  
Cohort that are CoW 
All  
Crimes 
Theft & 
Burglary 
Violent 
& Sexual 
Criminal 
Damage 
Fraud & 
Forgery 
Drug 
Offences 
i – Under 21s, All 
0.425*** 
(0.078) 
[49.00] 
0.420*** 
(0.133) 
[24.09] 
0.393*** 
(0.107) 
[9.79] 
0.490*** 
(0.066) 
[9.22] 
0.557** 
(0.208) 
[3.86] 
0.273 
(0.197) 
[3.44] 
ii – Under 21s, Males 
0.418*** 
(0.086) 
[74.83] 
0.462*** 
(0.140) 
[35.35] 
0.356*** 
(0.108) 
[16.50] 
0.510*** 
(0.074) 
[16.19] 
0.512** 
(0.221) 
[5.30] 
0.207 
(0.188) 
[5.80] 
iii – Under 21s, Females 
 
0.481*** 
(0.101) 
[21.47] 
0.317** 
(0.125) 
[12.10] 
0.474*** 
(0.146) 
[2.64] 
0.651*** 
(0.080) 
[1.80] 
0.340* 
(0.192) 
[2.33] 
0.438* 
(0.204) 
[0.93] 
Age Group,  Land, and 
Year Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Land Time Varying 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Land Specific Time 
Trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: The Land time varying controls are yearly measures of overall unemployment, youth unemployment rates; proportion foreign born by age 
groups; and number of police officers per 1,000 population. Estimates are weighted by Land and age group population size. Robust standard error 
clustered at the Land level in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 5 percent level. Average baseline arrest 
rates per 1,000 population in Eastern Länder when no cohorts are treated are in square brackets []. 
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Table 4 – Robustness Checks of Cohort Level Crime Results 
 
 
Description of Robustness Check Specification 
 
Log Arrest 
Rate 
Age Groups 
[Sample Size] 
1- Internal migration: control for of proportion of  
potential mothers moving from East to West   
0.424*** 
(0.089) 
Under 21s 
[2,280] 
2- Exclude all cohorts born after 1993 (which could be 
positively selected because of delayed fertility) 
0.596*** 
(0.143) 
Under 21s 
 [1,545] 
3- Exclude all cohorts born after 1993 and only include 
6 cohorts before 1991 (i.e. 1985 to 1990) 
0.621*** 
(0.147) 
Under 21s 
 [990] 
3- Exclude all Cohorts born after 1993 and only include 
3 cohorts before 1991 (i.e. 1988 to 1990) 
0.509*** 
(0.124) 
Under 21s 
 [810] 
4- Extending CoW sample to also include children born 
East in 1990 (i.e. 1990 to 1993) 
0.342*** 
(0.065) 
Under 21s 
[2,280] 
5- Extending CoW sample to also include children born 
East in 1994 (i.e. 1990 to 1994) 
0.422*** 
(0.095) 
Under 21s 
[2,280] 
6- Placebo: Treated Born from 1987 to 1989 
(Post-1990 Cohorts Dropped as Treated) 
0.056 
(0.057) 
Under 21s 
 [2,115] 
Note: All regressions include Land time varying controls overall unemployment, youth unemployment rate; 
proportion foreign born by age groups; and number of police officers per 1,000 population, and Land specific 
time trends. Cells are weighted by Land, age group and population size. Robust standard error clustered at the 
Land level in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. 
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Table 5 – Positive or Negative Selection of Fertility Decision 
Differences in Characteristics of Mothers of the ‘Children of the Wall’ 
 
 Sample: All Women who Had a Child  in East or West Germany between 1980 and 2000 
 Age of Mothers 
Years of 
Education 
Completed 
High School 
Married or 
Cohabiting 
Economic 
Activity 
Child of the Wall 
(i.e. East * 1991-93) 
-0.875*** 
 (0.235) 
-0.982*** 
 (0.157) 
-0.107*** 
 (0.026) 
-0.090*** 
 (0.030) 
-0.115*** 
 (0.017) 
Birth East  -2.657***  (0.131) 
0.686*** 
 (0.099) 
0.124*** 
 (0.009) 
-0.087*** 
 (0.011) 
0.068*** 
 (0.013) 
Birth 1991-93 0.291*  (0.168) 
 0.173* 
 (0.099) 
0.015* 
 (0.008) 
0.020 
 (0.013) 
-0.017 
(0.011) 
Number of Children Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Birth (Quadratic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort Size Weight Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 6,332 6,241 6,332 6,332 6,332 
 
Note: CoW is the interaction of having a child between 1991 and 1993 who was born in an East German Land. 
Robust standard errors clustered by child year of birth and East/West reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** 
denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Source: GSOEP 1990 to 2011. 
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Table 6 – Educational Attainment and Maternal Relationship at Age 17 of the ‘Children of the Wall’  
 
 Educational Attainment Maternal Relationship 
 School Drop-Out 
Repeated  
Grade 
Below 
 Average 
Scores 
Mother 
Important 
in Life 
Mother 
Loves Me 
Supportive 
Parenting 
Child of the Wall  
(i.e. East * 1991-93) 
- 0.013 
 (0.011) 
0.051*** 
 (0.021) 
0.226** 
 (0.090) 
-0.110** 
 (0.053) 
-0.141** 
 (0.064) 
-0.299** 
 (0.138) 
Born East -0.002 (0.008) 
-0.046** 
(0.019) 
-0.120* 
(0.060) 
0.046* 
(0.023) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
-0.077 
(0.092) 
Born 1991-1993 -0.006 (0.010) 
-0.030** 
(0.015) 
-0.009 
(0.086) 
0.036 
(0.031) 
-0.016 
(0.027) 
0.074 
(0.096) 
Male Dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of Siblings Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Single Mother Hhld   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Birth (Quadratic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort Size Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 3,292 3,375 3,326 3,332 3,299 3,234 
 
Note: CoW is the interaction of being born between 1991 and 1993 and being born in East Germany. Robust standard errors clustered by child 
year of birth and East/West reported in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. All 
information is taken from survey questions asked at age 17 in the GSOEP between 1990 and 2011. Below Average Scores indicates that the 
individual reported scores in math and German below the mean in his cohort. Mother Important in Life derives from the answer to a 4-points 
scale question which we dichotomize by grouping ‘important’ and ‘very important’ categories and the ‘less important’ and ‘not important at 
all’ ones together. Mother Loves Me comes from the question “Mother Shows that she Loves you” from which we generate a dummy variable 
which is one if the youths respond ‘very often’ and zero otherwise. Supportive Parenting is derived from a multi-item scale of 9 questions as 
described in Weinhardt and Schupp (2011) 
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Table 7 – Risk Attitude of Mothers and ‘Children of the Wall’ 
 
 Mothers (birth 1980 to 2000) 
Children 
(born 1980 to 1994) 
 Overall Risk Level 
 
Overall 
Risk Lover 
 
 “Bad”  
Risk Lover 
“Good”  
Risk Lover 
Overall 
Risk Level 
Overall 
Risk Lover 
Child of the Wall 
(i.e. East * 1991-93) 
0.289*** 
 (0.094) 
0.086*** 
(0.030) 
0.130*** 
 (0.032) 
0.028 
 (0.018) 
0.454** 
(0.190) 
0.081** 
(0.040) 
Birth/Born East 0.129** (0.053) 
0.020* 
(0.012) 
0.003 
 (0.012) 
0.016* 
 (0.009) 
-0.004 
(0.056) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
Birth/Born 1991-93 0.088  (0.075) 
0.004 
(0.008) 
-0.033 
 (0.022) 
0.005 
 (0.009) 
-0.191* 
(0.104) 
-0.028 
(0.025) 
Male Dummy No No No No Yes Yes 
Age (Quadratic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Years of Education  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Birth (Quadratic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort Size Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 11,076 8,413 5,815 
 
Note: CoW is the interaction of having had a child for mothers and for being born between 1991 and 1993 in East Germany. Robust standard errors clustered by 
child year of birth and East/West reported in parenthesis.*, **, and *** denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Source GSOEP 
between 1990 to 2011.Risk attitude measures come from the average of the 2004, 2006, 2008, 2009, and 2010 of questions on the willingness to take risk ranked 
between 0 (minimum) and 10 (maximum). “Bad”  Risk is derived from the willingness to take risk ‘while driving’ and ‘with own health’ and “Good” Risk is 
derived from willingness to take  ‘financial risk’. These risk specific questions were only asked in 2004 and 2009.  
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Table 8: Maternal Relationship and Risk Attitude of Siblings of the ‘Children of the Wall’  
 Maternal Relationship Risk Attitude 
 Important Loves Supportive Parenting 
Overall 
Risk Level 
Overall 
Risk Lover 
 
Sibling of a Child of the 
Wall  (born 1980 to 1991) 
 
-0.168*** 
(0.062) 
-0.148*** 
(0.048) 
-0.640*** 
(0.193) 
0.167* 
(0.094) 
0.081* 
(0.047) 
Born East 0.049** (0.022) 
0.038 
(0.022) 
0.084* 
(0.043) 
-0.021 
(0.037) 
0.013 
(0.015) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cohort Size Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Sample Size 3,292 3,375 3,326 3,318 3,332 
Table note: Siblings of ‘Children of the Wall’ are the older brothers or sisters of all individuals born between 1991 and 1992 in 
East Germany. Robust standard errors clustered by child year of birth and East/West reported in parenthesis.*, **, and *** 
denote respectively significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. Source GSOEP between 1990 to 2011. Definition of variables 
and controls are as in Table 6 for Maternal Relationship and as in Table 7 for Risk Attitude 
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Figure 1:  Annual Crude Birth Rate per 1,000 Women from 1950 and 2008 
 
Notes: Authors own calculations based administrative population data from the Federal Institute 
for Population Research (http://www.bib-demografie.de) 
 
Figure 2:  Year-on-Year Changes in Crude Birth Rates between East and West Germany 
 
Notes: Graph shows differences-in-differences coefficients year-on-year crude birth rates between 
East and West Germany calculated from the data presented in Figure 1.    
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Figure 3: Monthly Number of Births in East and West Germany from 1990 to 2000 
 
Notes: Administrative birth data from the Federal Institute for Population Research 
 
Figure 4: Difference in the Proportion of East and West Germans  
who are Very Worried about the Economy or Childcare from 1990 to 1996 
 
Note: The graphs are based on the difference in the proportion of East and West Germans responding 
‘Very’ (other possible answers: ‘Somewhat’ or ‘Not at all’) to questions asked yearly in GSOEP about 
individual level of worry about “the general economic development” and “childcare availability”. 
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Figure 5: Arrest Rate per 1,000 Population in East and West Germany 
for Cohorts Aged 6 to 7, 10 to 11, and 16 to 17 from 1993 to 2011 
 
A] Age group 6-7 
 
B] Age group 10-11 
 
C] Age group 16-17 
 
Notes: Author’s own calculation from administrative arrest data by two year age groups 
at the Land level provided by the Federal Criminal Police Office (www.bka.de)  
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Figure 6: Economic Uncertainty and Fertility Decision:  
Probability of Having a Child by Economic Worry and Education Level 
 
Note: The graph plots the estimated probability of having a child in the period 1991/93 separately for individuals 
reported to be very worried about the economy (‘very’ = 1 and ‘somewhat’/‘never = 0) or not, by years of 
education for all women aged 17 to 47 surveyed in GSOEP during this period. The probit model which generates 
these coefficients also includes education, age and year dummies. The grey area represents the 95 percent 
confidence intervals. 
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